We show when and how the principles of efficiency and equality might come together and develop a fairness compensation test. A simple graphical analysis is applied. If the faimess compensation test fails, efficiency and justice cannot be fully connected and a wedge between econornic and faimess principles remains. We discuss how important this wedge might be and argue that there does not exist a principle of systematic antinomy between efficiency and faimess.

For decades there has been a controversial debate over how far religious faith communities are specifically engaged in ecological practices (EP). Therefore we studied four Austrian and two German Benedictine monasteries religious ethics and spirituality as a means of a driving force for initiating EP. We draw upon theories of organizational learning processes and capacity-building of sustainability to interpret our empirical findings. The majority of monasteries are highly engaged in EP, initiated either as an outcome of individual activities or through (...) a specific mostly informally acting group, but rarely an organizationally or systematically integrated goal of the monasteries, or a focus of capacity building. Monasteries follow a technical and economic decision-making process in implementing EP. Spirituality plays a limited role in the initiation of EP. The environment of monasteries–acceptance or critique against ecological practices–influences the monasteries decisions. Institutionalization of ecological practices into the monasteries organizational structure is rare. (shrink)

In the original publication of this article, the equally contributed article note was missed.

Die jungsten Finanzkrisen haben die Diskussion uber die Moral der Markte wiederbelebt: Welche Verantwortung haben Unternehmen, Banken, Politik und letztlich jeder Einzelne in unserer Gesellschaft? Droht die Okonomisierung aller Lebensbereiche, der Ausverkauf des Menschen? Ist der Markt moralfrei? Brauchen wir neue Perspektiven und Werte? Diese drangenden Fragen werden im vorliegenden Buch von namhaften Autorinnen und Autoren wie Franz Muntefering und Rita Sussmuth beantwortet: Der Mensch muss wieder ins Zentrum rucken, Verantwortung und Moral sollten grundlegender Massstab auch des wirtschaftlichen Handelns sein. (...) Mit diesen Forderungen appellieren die BeitragerInnen an einen echten Dialog zwischen Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und Ethik. Mit Beitragen von Bernhard Emunds, Jurgen Hardt, Linus Hauser, Esther Junger, Josef Kaiser, Siegfried Karl, Andreas Lenz, Uta Meier-Grawe, Franz Muntefering, Thomas Petersen, Marcus K. Reif, Rainer Schwarz, Rita Sussmuth und Joachim Wiemeyer". (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 2 Seiten: 705-713.

Auch als originar politischer Denker ist Karl Jaspers reich an Einsichten: Ausgehend vom Ethos der Freiheit jedes Einzelnen richtet er seinen Blick auf die konkrete politische Gestaltung einer Freiheitsordnung. Dabei steht fur ihn im Hinblick auf die noch junge Bundesrepublik die Selbsterziehung in Freiheit im Zentrum seiner oft mahnenden Worte. Ganz im sokratischen Sinne fordert er intellektuelle Redlichkeit und politische Wahrhaftigkeit ein, um den beiden grossen Gegenwartsherausforderungen gewachsen zu sein: einer atomwaffenbestuckten Welt, die sich jederzeit selbst ausloschen kann, und (...) dem modernen Totalitarismus, der in seiner Verherrlichung des Antipolitischen allen politischen Ordnungsbestrebungen die Vernichtung androht. Jeder Frieden, der mehr ist als die Friedhofsruhe eines Waffenstillstands, grundet fur Jaspers in der politischen Freiheit handelnder Burgerinnen und Burger, die gemeinsam Sorge fur die Integritat ihres politischen Gemeinwesens tragen. Mit Beitragen von Karl-Heinz Breier, Alexander Gantschow, Anton Hugli, Annabelle Petschow, Kurt Salamun, Reinhard Schulz, Bernhard Sutor, Bernd Weidmann. (shrink)

Die Soncino-Gesellschaft war ein bibliophiler Verein, der sich 1924 in Berlin gründete und bis zu seiner Auflösung 1937 über hundert Publikationen aus vielen Gebieten der jüdischen Geschichte und Kultur herausgegeben hat. Sie versammelte Mitglieder aus allen Strömungen des Judentums unter ihrem Dach und entwickelte sich mit ihrem Anspruch, ästhetische Vorbilder für das jüdische Buch zu geben, zu einem jüdischen Integrationsprojekt. Der Beitrag geht den kulturzionistischen Bruchlinien nach, die sich in der zionistischen Rezeption, dem Streit um die hebräische Bibelausgabe und der (...) Positionierung einiger prominenter Protagonisten der Soncino-Gesellschaft zeigen. Diese Bruchlinien blieben jedoch so marginal, dass sie den bibliophilen Konsens nicht gefährdeten. Im historischen Rückblick kann das Programm der Soncino-Gesellschaft vielmehr als Kanon der deutsch-jüdischen Integration in der Diaspora gelesen werden. (shrink)

Welche Problemlagen fordern Christen heute heraus, sich politisch zu engagieren? In welchen Formen reagieren sie darauf? Wie soll sich Christliche Sozialethik auf solche "Politik aus dem Glauben" beziehen und wie kann sie diese orientierend unterstutzen? Das Buch ist dem Theorie-Praxis-Verhaltnis der Christlichen Sozialethik gewidmet, das fur das Denken von Prof. Dr. Friedhelm Hengsbach SJ zentral ist. Aus Anlass seines 80. Geburtstags setzen sich 22 namhafte Autorinnen und Autoren mit dieser Fragestellung auseinander. Neben Beitragen zum Wandel der politischen Praxis von Christen (...) und Grundlagenreflexionen zum Status der Sozialethik als praktischer Wissenschaft enthalt der Band Untersuchungen zu politischen Antworten auf Digitalisierung, europaische Krise und Rechtspopulismus sowie Artikel, in denen exemplarisch aufgezeigt wird, wie Sozialethik zur Orientierung sozialpolitischen oder wirtschaftlichen Handelns beitragen kann. Das Buch endet mit einer Antwort Friedhelm Hengsbachs. Mit Beitragen von Anika Christina Albert, Michelle Becka, Rainer Bucher, Bernhard Emunds, Johannes Eurich, Karl Gabriel, Stephan Goertz, Friedhelm Hengsbach SJ, Hans-Joachim Hohn, Traugott Jahnichen, Judith Konemann, Bernhard Laux, Walter Lesch, Andreas Lob-Hudepohl, Torsten Meireis, Dietmar Mieth, Matthias Mohring-Hesse, Martin Schneider, Michael Schramm, Christian Spiess, Johannes Ulrich, Markus Vogt, Gunter Wilhelm und Katja Winkler. (shrink)

We compare Karl Popper’s ideas concerning the falsifiability of a theory with similar notions from the part of statistical learning theory known as VC-theory . Popper’s notion of the dimension of a theory is contrasted with the apparently very similar VC-dimension. Having located some divergences, we discuss how best to view Popper’s work from the perspective of statistical learning theory, either as a precursor or as aiming to capture a different learning activity.

Cognitive science is experiencing a pragmatic turn away from the traditional representation-centered framework toward a view that focuses on understanding cognition as "enactive." This enactive view holds that cognition does not produce models of the world but rather subserves action as it is grounded in sensorimotor skills. In this volume, experts from cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, robotics, and philosophy of mind assess the foundations and implications of a novel action-oriented view of cognition. Their contributions and supporting experimental evidence show that (...) an enactive approach to cognitive science enables strong conceptual advances, and the chapters explore key concepts for this new model of cognition. The contributors discuss the implications of an enactive approach for cognitive development; action-oriented models of cognitive processing; action-oriented understandings of consciousness and experience; and the accompanying paradigm shifts in the fields of philosophy, brain science, robotics, and psychology. ContributorsMoshe Bar, Lawrence W. Barsalov, Olaf Blanke, Jeannette Bohg, Martin V. Butz, Peter F. Dominey, Andreas K. Engel, Judith M. Ford, Karl J. Friston, Chris D. Frith, Shaun Gallagher, Antonia Hamilton, Tobias Heed, Cecilia Heyes, Elisabeth Hill, Matej Hoffmann, Jakob Hohwy, Bernhard Hommel, Atsushi Iriki, Pierre Jacob, Henrik Jörntell, Jürgen Jost, James Kilner, Günther Knoblich, Peter König, Danica Kragic, Miriam Kyselo, Alexander Maye, Marek McGann, Richard Menary, Thomas Metzinger, Ezequiel Morsella, Saskia Nagel, Kevin J. O'Regan, Pierre-Yves Oudeyer, Giovanni Pezzulo, Tony J. Prescott, Wolfgang Prinz, Friedemann Pulvermüller, Robert Rupert, Marti Sanchez-Fibla, Andrew Schwartz, Anil K. Seth, Vicky Southgate, Antonella Tramacere, John K. Tsotsos, Paul F. M. J. Verschure, Gabriella Vigliocco, Gottfried Vosgerau. (shrink)

Bernhard Deister’s book Anthropologie im Dialog is a comparison of aspects of Karl Rahner’s theology with the psychology of Carl Rogers. Here the dialogue partner of the German philosophical theologian is an American psychologist of influence. The author begins: “These pages present two exemplary pictures of the human person, from theology and psychology. They unfold their approaches in an interdisciplinary dialogue.” The following pages summarize this comparison. Both thinkers see the human being as an active subject living in (...) the tensions between individuality and relation­ship, and then between immanence and transcendence. Building on this, Rogers’ psychology centers on the dynamics and emotions accompanying life with social groups, while Rahner is frequently involved in drawing particular theological disciplines like moral theology or ecclesiology forward into creative reflections on tradi­tion, spirituality, and praxis amid church and society. (shrink)

This article argues the following points. The Hobbesian hypothesis, which we define as the claim that all people are better off under state authority than they would be outside of it, is an empirical claim about all stateless societies. It is an essential premise in most contractarian justifications of government sovereignty. Many small-scale societies are stateless. Anthropological evidence from them provides sufficient reason to doubt the truth of the hypothesis, if not to reject it entirely. Therefore, contractarian theory has not (...) done what it claims to do: it has not justified state sovereignty to each person subject to it by demonstrating that they benefit from that authority. To be justified in contractarian terms, states have to do something to improve the living standards of disadvantaged people under their rule. (shrink)

Theories of explanation seek to tell us what distinctively explanatory information is. The most ambitious ones, such as the DN-account, seek to tell us what an explanation is, tout court. Less ambitious ones, such as causal theories, restrict themselves to a particular domain of inquiry. The least ambitious theories constitute outright skepticism, holding that there is no reasonably unified phenomenon to give an account of. On these views, it is impossible to give any theories of explanation at all. I argue (...) that both the less ambitious and outright skeptical varieties are committed to a certain context-sensitivity of our explanatory discourse. And though this discourse is almost certainly context-sensitive in some respects, it does not exhibit the context-sensitivity less than fully ambitious theories are committed to. Therefore, all accounts that seek to restrict themselves in scope, including causal accounts of explanation, fail. (shrink)

This paper argues that a guaranteed income is not only consistent with the principle of reciprocity but is required for reciprocity. This conclusion follows from a three-part argument. First, if a guaranteed income is in place, all individuals have the same opportunity to live without working. Therefore, those who choose not to work do not take advantage of a privilege that is unavailable to everyone else. Second, in the absence of an unconditional income, society is, in effect, applying the principle, (...) “(S)he who does not work, will not eat.” If the application of this principle is to be consistent with reciprocity, it must be applied to everyone. Most modern industrial societies exempt many citizens from that choice. For example, the owners of external assets do not face the work-or-starve choice and do take advantage of a privilege that is not available to others. An unconditional guaranteed income is one way to eliminate that violation of reciprocity. Third, this paper addresses the criticism that the guaranteed income exploits middle-class workers by demonstrating that a basic income will have a positive effect on wages, which will at least partially counteract the effect of the taxes needed to pay for it. (shrink)

Without directly addressing the Demarcation Problem for logic—the problem of distinguishing logical vocabulary from others—we focus on distinctive aspects of logical vocabulary in pursuit of a second goal in the philosophy of logic, namely, proposing criteria for the justification of logical rules. Our preferred approach has three components. Two of these are effectively Belnap’s, but with a twist. We agree with Belnap’s response to Prior’s challenge to inferentialist characterisations of the meanings of logical constants. Belnap argued that for a logical (...) constant to exist, its rules must be conservative over a previously given consequence relation and guarantee the uniqueness of the constant. The twist is that we require logical vocabulary to be provably conservative, not over a previously given formal consequence relation, but over a previously given meaningful vocabulary of a language. Uniqueness is also a feature defined in terms of provability: if two syntactically distinguished expressions are governed by the same rules, then formulas with them as main operators are interderivable. Belnap’s criteria are not only those for the existence of a logical constant, but more: they are what distinguishes logical vocabulary from all other expressions. It is the defining mark of a logical constant that it is provably conservative over the fragment of the language which excludes it and that its rules guarantee its uniqueness. The third component is the topic neutrality of logic. The provable conservativeness of logic over a previously given vocabulary of a language is motivated, in part, by appeal to molecularism in the theory of meaning. Molecularity is a feature endorsed by the theory of meaning as a whole, so it does not distinguish logical constants from other expressions. The same is true for conservativeness. We argue that molecularity, and hence conservativeness, are implicit presuppositions of speakers’ use of language: the addition of new vocabulary to a language is presupposed to be conservative. But this presupposition is one that we should be able reflectively to endorse (such as when attempting a rational reconstruction of the use of the vocabulary). Thus, where conservativeness is found to fail, this defect should be remedied and the use of the vocabulary corrected (as in classical negation) or excised altogether (as in pejoratives). We go on to characterise a notion of topic neutrality, which we argue applies to logical vocabulary. We then note that reflective endorsement of the conservativeness of a topic neutral vocabulary requires a proof that the vocabulary is conservative relative to any base vocabulary. Thus we require that logical vocabulary be demonstrably conservative. Allying this requirement, distinctive of logic, to a general consideration about the commitments of assertion yields a mode of justification for logical constants akin to some conceptions of Harmony, i.e., to the idea that the consequences of assertion of a logical complex need to be warranted by the grounds and ought to be the strongest consequences warranted by the grounds. Intuitionistic logic acquires a somewhat familiar justification but emanating from a new motivation. (shrink)

Michael Dummett's approach to the metaphysical issue of realism through the philosophy of language, his challenge to realism, and his philosophy of language itself are central topics in contemporary analytic philosophy and have influenced the work of other major figures such as Quine, Putnam, and Davidson. This book offers an accessible and systematic presentation of the main elements of Dummett's philosophy. This book's overarching theme is Dummett's discussion of realism: his characterization of realism, his attack on realism, and his invention (...) and exploration of the anti-realist position. This book begins by examining Dummett's views on language. Only against that setting can one fully appreciate his conception of the realism issue. With this in place, Weiss returns to Dummett's views on the nature of meaning and understanding to unfold his challenge to realism. Weiss devotes the remainder of the book to examining the anti-realist position. He discusses anti-realist theories of meaning and then investigates anti-realism's revisionary consequences. Finally, he engages with Dummett's discussion of two difficult challenges for the anti-realist: the past and mathematics. (shrink)

Wiredu argues intriguingly that some philosophical questions only arise in certain linguistic settings. So philosophical questions are, on occasion, linguistically relative or, more vividly, Tongue Dependent. The phenomenon however does not rest on expressive differences between languages, or, better, on failures of translation. Though rejecting his example, I endorse the general possibility he constructs. I do so provided that there is a solution to the Paradox of Analysis. Indeed I point out that the possibility of Tongue Dependency is both necessary (...) and sufficient for a solution to the Paradox of Analysis. I then offer a solution to the Paradox of Analysis in a Fregean setting, by distinguishing within the cognitive value of a claim between cognitive accomplishment and cognitive significance. The results of analysis involve cognitive accomplishment, though have no cognitive significance. I recommend my account as dealing well with a problem Salmon raised for the Church-Frege account. Finally, I direct my account on vocabularies rather than claims and note that, though possible, actual cases of Tongue Dependency within natural languages are highly doubtful. The phenomenon does not have the cultural significance Wiredu claims for it. (shrink)

Karl Britton; The Truth of Religious Propositions, Analysis, Volume 3, Issue 1-2, 1 October 1935, Pages 21–27, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/3.1-2.21.

Karl Jaspers pflegte intensive Kontakte zu seinen Verlagen. Diese bisher unveroffentlichten Briefwechsel von 1911 bis 1968 sind biografisch und werkgeschichtlich zentral, denn sie geben wesentliche Einblicke in die Personlichkeit und das Leben von Karl Jaspers ebenso wie in sein Selbstverstandnis als Psychopathologe, Psychologe, Philosoph und politischer Schriftsteller. Insbesondere lassen die Briefe die Entstehung und Rezeption von Jaspers' Schriften zutage treten, zeugen von mitunter muhsamen Ubersetzungsverhandlungen und dokumentieren auch den Austausch uber wichtige Buchprojekte, die zu Jaspers' Lebzeiten nicht mehr (...) realisiert wurden. Der erste Band enthalt u.a. Briefwechsel mit den Verlagen Artemis, de Gruyter, Les Editions de Minuit, Harper & Row, Mohr Siebeck, Routledge, Springer, Suhrkamp und Yale University Press, mit den Verlegern Kurt und Helen Wolff sowie mit verschiedenen Ubersetzern. Im Anhang sind Dokumente und Korrespondenzen aus der Zeit von 1933 bis 1943 wiedergegeben, vor allem Jaspers' Korrespondenz mit der Reichsschrift tumskammer. Der zweite Teilband widmet sich ausschliesslich der Korrespondenz mit Klaus Piper und dem Piper Verlag. Die Briefe werden in Auswahl, aber jeweils vollstandig wiedergegeben. (shrink)

Die Serie "Meisterwerke der Literatur" beinhaltet die Klassiker der deutschen und weltweiten Literatur in einer einzigartigen Sammlung für Ihren eBook Reader. Lesen Sie die besten Werke großer Schriftsteller,Poeten, Autoren und Philosophen auf Ihrem Reader. Dieses Werk bietet zusätzlich * Eine Biografie/Bibliografie des Autors. Vorländer Werk gehört auch heute noch zu den Referenzbüchern. Inhalt: Karl Vorländer – Biografie und Bibliografie Geschichte der Philosophie Vorwort zur 1. Auflage. Aus dem Vorwort zur 2. Auflage. Vorwort zur 3. Auflage. Zur fünften Auflage. Einleitung. (...) 1. Philosophie. Ihr Name und Begriff. 2. Die Geschichte der Philosophie. Ihre Methode, Quellen und Hilfsmittel. Einteilung des Stoffes. 3. Verhältnis der orientalischen Völker zur Philosophie. 4. Selbständigkeit der griechischen Philosophie. Quellen und Hilfsmittel zu ihrer Geschichte. Die Philosophie des Altertums Erste Periode. Vorsokratische Philosophie. Kapitel I. Anfänge der Reflexion über den Kosmos. Kapitel II. Anfänge der Reflexion über das Denken vom Kosmos. Sein und Werden (die Eleaten und Heraklit). Kapitel III. Die jüngeren Naturphilosophen: Empedokles, Anaxagoras u. a. Kapitel IV. Zweite Periode. Sokrates und die Sophisten. Kapitel V. Die sophistische Aufklärung. Kapitel VI. Sokrates. Kapitel VII. Die sokratischen Schulen. Dritte Periode. Die klassische Philosophie der Griechen: Plato und Aristoteles. Kapitel VIII. Plato. Kapitel IX. Aristoteles. Vierte Periode. Die hellenistisch-römische Philosophie. A. Hellenistische Periode. Kapitel X. Die Stoiker. Kapitel XI. Die Epikureer. Kapitel XII. Die Skeptiker. B. Die Philosophie auf dem Boden des römischen Weltreichs. Kapitel XIII. Die Philosophie bei den Römern. Kapitel XIV. Vorläufer des Neuplatonismus. Kapitel XV. Die Neuplatoniker. Die Philosophie des Mittelalters. Erster Abschnitt. Die Philosophie der Kirchenväter (Patristik). Kapitel I. Ältere Patristik. Kapitel II. Jüngere Patristik Zweiter Abschnitt. Die Scholastik. Kapitel III. Die Anfänge der Scholastik. Kapitel IV. Die Glanzzeit der Scholastik. Kapitel V. Ausgang der Scholastik. Zunehmender Zwiespalt zwischen Glauben und Wissen. Blüte der deutschen Mystik. Die Philosophie der Neuzeit Übergangsperiode. Kapitel I. Die Philosophie der Renaissance. Kapitel II. Die Begründung der modernen Naturwissenschaft. Erste Periode. Die Zeit der grossen Systeme. Kapitel I. Descartes (1596-1650). Kapitel II. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Kapitel III. Spinoza (1632-1677). Kapitel IV. Leibniz (1646-1716). Zweite Periode. Die Philosophie der Aufklärung. A. England und Schottland. Kapitel V. Locke (1632-1704). Kapitel VI. Weitere Entwicklung der Aufklärungsphilosophie in England. B. In Frankreich. Kapitel VII. Die französische Aufklärungsphilosophie von Bayle bis Rousseau. C. In Deutschland. Kapitel VIII. Die deutsche Aufklärungsphilosophie. Dritte Periode.Die Neubegründung der Philosophie durch Immanuel Kant Kapitel IX. Einleitung. Kapitel X. Kants Neubegründung der Wissenschaft. Kapitel XI. Die regulativen Prinzipien der Erfahrung oder die Ideen. Kapitel XII. Kants Neubegründung der Ethik. Kapitel XIII. Die Begründung der Ästhetik. Vierte Periode. Die Systeme der nachkantischen Philosophie von Fichte bis Schopenhauer. Kapitel XIV. Einleitung: Von Kant zu Fichte. Kapitel XV. Fichte. Kapitel XVI. Schelling. Kapitel XVII. Hegel. Kapitel XVIII. Kritische Nebenströmungen. Schleiermacher, Herbart, Beneke. Kapitel XIX. Schopenhauer. Fünfte Periode. Die Philosophie der Gegenwart. Kapitel XX. Der Positivismus. Kapitel XXI. Materialismus und Spiritualismus. Kapitel XXII. Die moderne Entwicklungsphilosophie: Darwin, Spencer. Kapitel XXIII. Idealistische Systembildungen auf naturwissenschaftlicher Grundlage. Kapitel XXIV. Die Erneuerung des Kritizismus. Kapitel XXV. Sozialismus und Individualismus. Kapitel XXVI. Sonstige philosophische Erscheinungen der Gegenwart. Zeittafel zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. Fußnoten. (shrink)

This paper is a very early and very preliminary report of some of the findings from the research project, "Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy." The project eventually lead to two books: "Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy" and "the Prehistory of Private Property" (both coauthored by Grant S. McCall). The basic argument of the project is that influential, modern political theories often rely on dubious claims about prehistory. It examines the political philosophy literature to show how these claims are (...) used as essential premises in influential arguments. It then examines evidence from anthropology, archaeology, and history to show that these claims are dubious. This paper previews some of the early findings of the project that became those books. Please cite the books rather than this preliminary report. For info or access to the books, contact Karl at widerquist dot com. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 40.1 (2006) 35-53 [Access article in PDF] "Truth Is What Works": Francisco J. Varela on Cognitive Science, Buddhism, the Inseparability of Subject and Object, and the Exaggerations of Constructivism—A Conversation Francisco J. Varela Bernhard Poerksen Institut für Journalistik und Kommunikationswissenschaft Universität Hamburg Francisco J. Varela (1946-2001) studied biology in Santiago de Chile, obtained his doctorate 1970 at Harvard University with a dissertation on (...) the insect eye, and worked there for some time in the laboratory of Torsten Wiesel, the later Nobel Laureate for medicine. From his scientific beginnings as a researcher in biology, he not only studied and practiced biology but, resisting the dominating mainstream, pursued a research program that ignored and broke down traditional disciplinary boundaries. This research program is best characterized as experimental epistemology, a concept introduced by the neuropsychiatrist and cybernetician Warren S. McCulloch. Francisco J. Varela's great aspiration was to examine and answer the philosophical ur-question of cognition with scientific precision and with the help of the best possible theoretical framework. [End Page 35]Having obtained his doctorate, he went back to Chile to work as a professor of biology together with Humberto R. Maturana. He contributed to the writing of the theory of autopoiesis, which was to cause a furor in the world of science as a universally applicable explanatory model. After the overthrow of Allende and the installation of the dictatorship by the putsch general Pinochet, Francisco J. Varela first escaped to Costa Rica, then became a professor at the American University of Colorado and University of New York, and finally returned in 1980 to the University of Chile in Santiago for five years. Temporary positions as guest professor for neurobiology, philosophy, and cognitive science in Germany, Switzerland, and France led him to Paris in the end, where he worked as research director of the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique until his death on May 28, 2001.In his research work embracing cognitive science, evolutionary theory, and immunology, Francisco J. Varela, constantly inspired by his fundamental interest in the key questions of epistemology, gave the epistemological debate a new orientation. In his thinking he refuses to accept the strict separation of subject and object, of knower and known, which as a rule unites realists and constructivists alike. Francisco J. Varela rejects the fundamental dualism dividing mind and world, which had shaped Western philosophy from its earliest beginnings. He does not subscribe to the idea that human individuals can invent their own realities—blindly and arbitrarily, and without experiencing any resistance from the external world and all other things given. He equally distances himself, however, from the diametrically opposite position that overstates the eigenpower of the world of objects. The external world and all other things given cannot determine what happens in an organism. Varela's claim is that individual and world create each other. The Computational Model of the Mind Poerksen: The ancient key questions of philosophy are at the center of modern cognitive science. What is the essence of the mind? Do our conceptions represent a given world, which is independent from our minds? What is the formative power of external objects over our perceptions? How does cognition function? The search for an adequate answer and an improved understanding of the human mind has led many cognitive scientists to entertain the assumption that the brain is actually a kind of computer. Memory is taken to be a store. Thinking and perceiving are understood as data processing in the sense that an independent external world is computationally transformed into symbols and represented in the organism in this manner. You are very critical of this view. Why?Varela: If the brain is considered as a kind of computer, then cognitive research is limited to discovering certain self-sufficient shapes—the symbols—together with the rules [End Page 36] governing them—the programs. But this search for symbols and programs will never be profitable because it... (shrink)